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The economics-literature, drawing on endogenous growth theory, suggests that the level 
of financial sector development may influence foreign direct investment and its impact 
on the diffusion of technology in the host country, thereby increasing the rate of 
economic growth. Little attention, however, has been devoted to confirm or reject this 
link for China. This paper fills this gap by including measures of financial sector 
development in the growth regression. The Generalized Method of Moments system 
estimation is applied to data for 28 Chinese provinces over the period 1986-2003. We 
show that the interaction between foreign direct investment and indicators measuring the 
degree of market-oriented financing enhance economic growth.  
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I. Introduction  
The past decades has witnessed a dramatic increase in foreign capital flows to China, of 
which foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a crucial role. The stock of FDI 
increased from a mere USD 25 billion in 1990 to USD 610 billion in 2005, and in 2003 
China took the place of the United States as the greatest FDI recipient country. Several 
factors contributed to this rapid growth, including the move towards economic 
liberalization, low cost of labour, and advances made in technologies. The economics-
literature explains well the short-term consideration, such as the determinants and 
consequences of such inflow to China. Less understood, on the other hand, is how the 
response of economic growth to FDI varies with the level of development of the 
financial sector; an intrinsically important question as financial integration becomes a 
reality for China. 
The claim that domestic financial intermediation may influence economic growth is 
well documented and based on an extensive literature that has developed over the last 
decade, drawing on developments in endogenous growth theory. This body of work, 
reviewed by Levine (1997, 2005), emphasizes how improved domestic financial 
intermediation can promote economic growth through its effect on capital accumulation
1. 
Remarkably but true, this literature not only suggests that economic growth rarely occurs 
without a functioning financial system but that the level of domestic financial sector 
development may influence FDI and its impact on the diffusion of technology in the 
host country thereby increasing the rate of economic growth. Thus, the level of 
development of China’s financial system, reflected in its ability to exercise functions such 
as mobilizing savings, helping to allocate capital, and facilitating risk management, is 
likely to influence the extent to which economic growth respond to FDI and the inflow 
of foreign capital in general.  
While little attention has been devoted to confirm or reject that claim for China, 
Bailliu (2000), and Hermes and Lensink (2003) provide evidence that for international 
capital inflows to have both positive spill over effects and a significant impact on 
economic growth, the domestic financial sector must have a certain minimum level of 
development. These results are confirmed by Alfaro et al., (2004) and Durham (2004) 
who provides evidence that only countries with well-developed financial markets gain 
significantly from FDI in terms of their growth rate. On the other hand, Aghion et al., 
                                                        
1 See McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Levine et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2000.  
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(2006) claim that only in those countries with relatively less developed technology could 
local financial development play a positive role in the link between FDI and economic 
growth.  
The lack of empirical evidence on the consequences of financial sector 
development to the response of economic growth to FDI in China is partly due to the 
fact that the literature on FDI in recent years has focused on shorter-term considerations, 
such as the determinants of FDI and the consequences of such inflow. This research 
agenda has likely been influenced by the rapid inflow of foreign capital to the Chinese 
economy along side the more than decade-long high growth
2. There is no doubt that 
existing work in this field has improved our understanding of what determines FDI and 
its overall impact in China. However, to achieve a more complete understanding of the 
potential ramifications of FDI in China, research should also address the longer-term 
consequences of financial sector development. To the authors’ knowledge, no existing 
study has examined whether there is evidence that the level of domestic financial sector 
development is a factor in the link between FDI and economic growth in China in the 
context of an econometric framework that controls for the determinants of economic 
growth. 
This paper helps to fill this gap in the literature. This is done in the econometric 
analysis by including various measures of the development of China’s financial sector 
(such as financial depth, the level of state intervention, and the degree of market-
oriented financing) in the growth regression. A dynamic panel-data methodology is used 
that controls for province-specific effects and accounts for autocorrelation and the 
potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables.  
We find evidence that the interaction between FDI and traditionally used indicators 
of financial sector development, as well as indicators measuring the level of state 
interventionism in finance are generally negatively associated with economic growth, 
while the interaction between FDI and indicators measuring the degree of market-
oriented financing in the economy promote economic growth. 
The paper is structured as follows: The next section presents an overview of China’s 
financial system, FDI, and the finance-growth nexus. The data and descriptive statistics 
are presented in section 3, empirical results are discussed in section 4, and finally a 
                                                        
2 See Zhang and Ouyang (2003); Cheung and Lin (2004); Prasad and Wei (2006). For a discussion on 
absorptive capacity: Makki and Somwaru, (2004). For a discussion on FDI, economic growth and the 
threshold effect: Borensztein et al., (1998). For spillover channels: Blomström and Kokko (1998); Lipsey 
(2002).   
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summary is provided in section 5.   
II. Financial System, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in China 
Development of  China’s financial system  
The abandonment of the single-banking system in 1979 marked the beginning of China’s 
financial reforms
3. The Agriculture Bank of China, the People’s Construction Bank of 
China and the Bank of China were split from the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), which 
formally became the country’s central bank. Each of the three specialized banks was to 
provide services to a designated sector of the economy respectively dealing with banking 
in rural areas, investment in manufacturing, and foreign currency transactions. A fourth 
specialized bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which took over all 
commercial transactions, was created in 1984. In the following year the restrictions 
limiting each bank to its own designated sector were lifted and the four banks were 
allowed to compete with each other in providing loans and deposit services. Competition, 
however, remained limited until the mid-1990s as the banks continued to serve as policy 
lending conduits for the government, and lacking the requisite autonomy to compete 
(Wong and Wong 2001).  
The Central Bank Law and the Commercial Bank Law in 1995 further deepened 
China’s financial reforms. It allowed the rest of the state-owned banks (SOBs) to 
concentrate on commercially-oriented lending and emphasized the need for financial 
institutions to incorporate commercial criteria into their lending practices. As such, both 
laws lay the basis for building a modern banking system in China. A number of non-state 
owned banks entered the financial system, including urban and rural credit cooperatives, 
trust and investment companies, financial companies, and other institutions. Limited 
licenses were granted to foreign banks which further reduced government intervention in 
credit allocation, interest rate control were loosened, and standard accounting and 
prudential norms was recommended (Shirai, 2002).   
The Chinese government also set up three state banks with special functions: the 
State Development Bank, the Agricultural Development Bank of China, and the Export 
and Import Bank of China, with the mission for implementing government steering 
policy and providing funds for reconstruction projects. The separation between policy 
banks and commercial banks was, however, far from complete. The policy banks lacked 
                                                        
3 For a comprehensive description on the evolution of China’s financial system the readers are directed to 
Wong and Wong (2001); Shirai (2002); Naughton (2006) for well-regarded studies.  
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sufficient branch networks or capital to engage in the level of policy lending previously 
provided by the specialized banks and, hence the commercial banks continued to engage 
in policy lending in one form or another (Wong and Wong, 2001)
4. Although policy 
lending limited competition among state commercial banks, the entry of new banks 
created a new source of competition in the industry. A further impulse for changes in the 
banking sector in China came about with China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001. Progress includes fewer restrictions on ownership, 
increased operational freedom and declining rates of non-performing loans. With China’s 
accession into the WTO, further penetration of the foreign banks and increasing 
competition are also predicted. 
With increasing competition we would also expect a decrease in overall 
concentration of SOBs. Table 1 shows that in terms of its share in deposits and loans, 
SOB overall concentration have decreased significantly with both measures declining 
from above 90 percent to about 50 percent over the 1990-2003 period. This, however, is 
not strong enough evidence to say that the dominance of the SOBs has disappeared and 
as such, the transition to a modern and competitive- oriented banking sector is still to be 
achieved
5. Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2004) further suggest that the level of capital 
mobility within China is low, and that China’s financial markets remain fragmented across 
regions as a result from direct and indirect government control over interest rate and 
resource allocation (World Bank 2003)
6. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
During the last decade, China’s private sector has been an increasingly dynamic 
component in the Chinese economy and a powerful engine for economic growth (Hua et 
al., 2006). Development of financial intermediation in general, and through its credit 
expansion to the private sector in particular, is likely to increase support to the growth of 
this rapidly growing sector. Table 2 presents five financial indicators that describe China’s 
financial system and the development of financial intermediation; (i) the ratio of money 
and quasi-money to GDP – (M2/GDP), (ii) the ratio of total financial assets to GDP – 
(FIR), that is., the financial intermediation ratio (iii) The gap between the ratio of total 
                                                        
4 The PBoC do not constitute an independent entity and remain subject to government control. 
5 Until 1998, the four state-owned commercial banks were instructed to lend to SOEs. The system was 
liberalized at the end of 1990s and theoretically it is not in place any more.   
6 See also Guillaumont and Hua (2002).  
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financial assets to GDP and the ratio of total loans to deposits of SOBs, that is., the 
financial marketization ratio – (FMR), (iv) the ratio of non-bank credits to GDP – 
(NBC/GDP), and (v) the ratio of household saving deposits in financial intermediaries 
relative to GDP – (HHSFI/GDP).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The indicators show that financial deepening (M2/GDP) has increased significantly from 
82 percent in 1990 to 189 percent in 2003. This is much higher than most economies and 
higher than East-Asian economies such as Japan. The substantial increase in this ratio, 
and including HHSFI/GDP and FIR, means that financial resources are available for 
investment in China. The other indicators confirm a rapid financial development is 
taking place in China. 
The financial reform program also continuously rehabilitates the balance sheets of 
the four largest SOBs as large scales of non-performing loans (NPL) in China’s banking 
sector continue impede the further development of financial intermediaries
7. These 
problems are partly dealt with by the four asset management corporations established in 
1999 with the objective of taking over a large fraction of NPL and bad debts from the 
SOBs. Although still high by the standards of industrialized countries, this high level of 
NPLs may not have appropriately reflected the efficiency of financial institutions since 
the capital of SOBs does not reflect their ultimate liabilities when their owner (China’s 
government) is willing to back them. 
China’s emerging capital markets have also experienced significant development. 
Since the opening of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in the early 1990s, 
China’s stock market has rapidly expanded. The enactment and implementation of the 
Securities Law in 1999 provided detailed rules and legal basis to regulate the investors 
and the listed companies. Since then, China’s stock market has played an increasingly 
important role in the Chinese economy, by facilitating capital raising, promoting domestic 
investment, and improving efficiency of financial resource allocation. Furthermore, rapid 
developments have also occurred in China’s bonds market, money market, foreign 
exchange market, and other aspects of the financial sector. 
Although China’s financial system is not yet developed according to the standards of 
                                                        
7 Heavy burden of ’policy lending’, poor banking operation and management, soft budget constraint 
because of insider control and government intervention, and the lack of sufficient regulation and 
monitoring have long been recognized as the main causes to the accumulation of NPL in China.  
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industrialized countries, there have been a steadily development of the country’s financial 
system. Not only has asset quality, capital adequacy and management been improved, but 
the financial system has also demonstrated robustness to financial fragility as compared 
to those countries badly hit during the Asian financial crisis. 
 
The development of  foreign direct investment in China 
China’s high rate of economic growth since the adoption of more liberal policies in the 
late 1970s is an astonishing accomplishment in several respects and by almost all 
accounts, FDI has been one of the major success stories of the past 15 years or more. 
From 1949 until 1979, China had been closed entirely to FDI but as part of a series of 
reform a partial opening was implemented in 1979. In its early stages, FDI was restricted 
to China’s four Special Economic Zones and limited to equity joint ventures. In 1984, a 
new foreign investment law was adopted to accelerate FDI growth and a number of 
preferential policies were used by both central and local governments to attract FDI. 
This radically improved both the institutional framework and the general investment 
climate. A sharp increase in foreign investor’s confidence to invest in China occurred 
after 1992 when China reaffirmed policies of openness and market-oriented reforms 
introduced earlier. This proved very successful. 
In 1985, annual FDI inflow were less than USD 2 billion, while in 2005, they were 
USD 63 billion. Although the late 1990s saw a small decrease in FDI inflows, the annual 
growth rate of FDI inflows to China increased to over 10 percent after China joined the 
WTO in 2001. The stock of FDI increased from a mere U$D 25 billion in 1990 to U$D 
610 billion in 2005. In 2003 China took the place of the United States as the greatest 
FDI recipient country, and in 2005 China became the world’s fourth largest FDI-stock 
country, only after the US, United Kingdom and Germany. If we take into consideration 
the gap between China and developed economies in total capital formation, the role of 
FDI in the capital formation process and thus for economic growth, becomes even more 
important. According to Huang (2003), the ratio of FDI inflow to capital formation in 
China’s non-state sectors reached about 26 percent in average in the 1990s, which is next 
only to Singapore (30.3%) in main Asian countries. And as noted by Whally and Xin 
(2006), China’s foreign invested enterprises may have contributed more than 40 percent 
of China’s economic growth in 2003 and 2004. Although there are significant disparities 
across regions, every province has achieved high growth rates. It is also commonly 
known that FDI has significantly benefited the coastal regions and to a lesser extent  
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interior regions. Finally, China’s FDI inflows falls into two categories. One is horizontal 
FDI involving the transfer of production from abroad to China to service the Chinese 
internal market. The other is vertical FDI which seeks to take advantage of low cost 
production for export of products abroad.  
 
Financial sector development, FDI and economic growth in China: Empirical evidence 
Over time, a number of studies have looked separately at the links between indicators of 
financial sector development and growth on the one hand, and the link between FDI and 
economic growth on the other hand. Rather than providing the reader with affirmative 
conclusions, these studies have yielded remarkably contrasting results. 
For instance, Laurenceson (2001), using Chinese national level data, concluded that 
investment financed through domestic loans has been productive, at least when 
compared with other investment financing sources. Similar results were obtained by Liu 
and Li (2001) who attempted to shed light on the same issue using provincial data. But, 
Aziz and Duenwald (2002) dismiss financial development as a catalyst for growth among 
Chinese provinces. Using a similar approach, Boyreau-Debray (2003) finds that credit 
extended by the banking sector has a negative impact on growth. But these facts neither 
are undisputed and a more recent study by Hao (2006) finds that Chinese growth has 
been fostered by the substitution of loans for state budget appropriation, but not by loan 
expansion. These findings are challenged by Cheng and Degryse (2006), Guariglia and 
Poncet (2006), and Guillmont et al., (2006) who argue that banking sector development 
spurs economic growth in China. 
Generally speaking, the empirical literature on FDI in China could be categorized 
into two groups: Those who investigate the cause of the large FDI inflow and those who 
investigate the consequence of such inflow. That is, economists raise and try to answer 
two questions: Why would China absorb so much FDI consistently for two decades, and 
what is the impact of that FDI.
8 But although FDI in China has stimulated growth in 
income that would almost surely not have been realized in the absence of this investment, 
the results remain contrasting
9. A majority of empirical studies supports the growth 
enhancing effect of FDI in China through various links (Whalley and Xin, 2006; Tseng 
and Zebregs, 2002; Sun and Parikh, 2001; Berthelemy and Demurger, 2000; Borensztein 
et al., 1998). But other studies conclude that technology transfer and the spill over effects 
                                                        
8 See Cheung and Lin (2004). 
9 For an overview of the literature on the relationship between FDI and economic growth: Borensztein et al., 
(1995); Bende-Nabende and Ford (1998).  
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are more limited, and argue that much if not most of the correlation between FDI and 
superior economic performance is driven by reverse causality (Yong and Lan, 1997; 
Rodrik, 1999). 
III. Data and Description of Variables 
The key data used in this paper are indicators of financial depth, financial sector 
development and distortions, as well as measures of real economic growth and its 
sources. The sample consists of a panel of 28 provinces in Mainland China for the 
period 1986 to 2003
10. The data is compiled from the China Statistical Year Book (1990-
2004) and the Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China 
(1999)
11. All monetary values are converted to 1990 constant prices by using provincial 
GDP deflator.  
 
Indicators of  financial sector development 
The main purpose of our empirical analysis is to investigate whether the development of 
the financial sector is a factor in the link between FDI and economic growth. To asses 
the robustness of our results the present paper categorizes nine indicators into three 
groups following Guarglia and Poncet (2006). The three groups of indicators are 
measures of financial depth; misallocation of financial resources; and, market-oriented 
financing respectively. These indicators allow us to account for both size and a quality 
effect of financial intermediaries. 
 
Group 1: Indicators of  financial depth: 
It is difficult to construct accurate financial depth indicators of China, especially at the 
provincial level, since the data related with monetization variable (say M2 over GDP) is 
only available at national level. Goldsmith (1969) suggested an indicator defined as the 
ratio of total financial assets to GDP to represents the financial structure and financial 
development of one country or region, popularly called the financial interrelation ratio, 
FIR. In this paper we use a similar variable to measure the financial deepening, or 
banking sector size, of a province defined as the ratio of total (bank and non-bank) 
credits to GDP (Finance 1). The second indicator is defined as the ratio of household 
                                                        
10 China is administratively decomposed into 31 provincial units which fall into three categories: provinces (a 
total of 22), autonomous regions (a total of 5), and municipal cities (a total of 4). Tibet, Sichuan and 
Chongqing are excluded from our sample due to data constraints. 
11 We are grateful to Alessandra Guariglia and Sandra Poncet, and Yao Yang for providing additional data of 
financial indicators.  
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saving deposits to GDP (Finance 2). This indicator excludes corporate deposits, which 
might be affected by central government’s credit policies. As argued by Hao (2006), 
household’s deposits are based on households own decisions, and are much less 
influenced by central government policies. These two indicators measure the financial 
resources that are available for investment in China. 
 
Group 2: Indicators for misallocation and distortion 
To evaluate the specific impact of misallocation of funds we rely on two indicators 
measuring the role of state interventionism induced distortions in the financial sector. 
The first indicator is the ratio of loans to deposits, which serves as a proxy for centre re-
lending (Finance 3). We follow the previous literature and consider this to be a measure of 
the Central Bank’s credit to local branch banks aimed at helping them to meet their 
lending quotas (Boyreau-Debray, 2003; Guirgilia and Poncet, 2006). Thus, this is a 
measure of the interventionism of the Central Bank. In China, while the volume of 
deposits is determined by economic activity, the volume of lending is largely determined 
by policy objectives and is set through a credit plan independently of branch banks in 
each region to finance the lending target from local deposits.  
As pointed out by Boyreau-Debray (2003), some rapidly growing provinces could 
therefore have a low credit quota and be constrained in their lending relative to the rapid 
growth of their deposits. Alternatively, branch banks in slower growing regions could be 
assigned high quotas with insufficient local deposits to finance their lending: these 
provinces would depend on the Central Bank to lend them additional funds. The second 
indicator in this group aims at measuring the relative size of the state-owned banks, 
which is given by the ratio of SOBs credits to total bank credits (Finance 4). 
 
Group 3: Indicators for market-oriented financial transactions 
The precondition of the efficiency of financial systems is the marketization process of 
financial markets, which implies that financial resources should be used under the 
condition of profit maximization. In this paper we rely on the information of the 
decomposition of fixed asset investment by resource, which includes domestic loans, 
state budgetary appropriation and retained earnings. Retained earning is usually 
recognized as the hardest constraint for financing, while domestic loans are softer, 
although it is harder than budgetary appropriation in the sense of misallocation and 
distortion. The directions of financial resources can also proxy for the efficiency when  
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they are used.  
Another indicator of financial sector development in different regions is defined as the 
ratio of real non-bank credits to GDP, which measure the level of marketization in the 
financial system. Finally, we also use the ratio of credits to private sectors. We borrow 
this indicator from Lu and Yao (2004), who derive the indicator by dividing short-term 
credits to non-state sectors by total credits. This indicator serves as an instrument for the 
efficiency of domestic financial development.  
There are altogether five indicators in this group: (i) Fixed asset financed by 
domestic loans to state budgetary appropriation (Finance 5), (ii) The ratio of fixed assets 
financed by self raised funds to total credits (Finance 6), (iii) Fixed asset financed by 
budgetary appropriation to total credits (Finance 7), (iv) the ratio of real non-bank credit 
to GDP (Finance 8), and (v) The ratio of credits to private sectors (Finance 9). 
 
 Financial sector development: a factor in the link between FDI and economic growth 
Here, we construct an interaction term between the proxy for FDI and the financial 
development indicators. These interaction terms are then used to evaluate whether the 
development of the financial sector is in fact a link between FDI and economic growth. 
In Alfaro et al., (2004), they simply multiply the FDI variable with financial indicators. In 
the present paper we first use the value of FDI over GDP (FDI) as the proxy for FDI 
and then multiply by the various financial indicators. We also construct a dummy by 
comparing the value of one financial indicator in a specific year to its average value 
across different regions in that year and multiply by the proxy for FDI. If the finance 
indicator is larger than average, then we set the dummy as one, otherwise zero. Finally, 
the FDI variable is multiplied with the finance variable when that is larger than a 
threshold, which is also given by the average value of a financial indicator. Thus, the 
latter two specifications investigate whether the interaction between FDI and a higher 
level than average of the finance indicator exert a positive or negative effect on economic 
growth. We have three indicators: (i) FDI*Financial, (ii) FDI*Dummy and, (iii) FDI*Finance 
(threshold).  
 
 Indicators of  economic growth  
The methodology follows the voluminous growth literature, which was initiated by the  
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seminal paper of Barro (1991)
12. The present paper, however, add a novelty to the 
existing literature by adding a new variable in the growth regression - the percent of 
GDP per capita in one province of one year relative to the total of all provinces in that 
year (GDPRATIO). The construction of this variable is motivated by the fact that 
macroeconomic data are in some sense always endogenous and relate to each other. In 
the standard case, we minimize the endogeneity problem, by using a dynamic panel-data 
model as the basic specification with the chosen indicator for annual growth. But, while 
traditionally, economists use annual growth rate or the absolute value of GDP per capita 
as the dependent variable, both of them may cause some problems in this respect: In a 
dynamic panel-data specification, variables are differenced before regression analysis 
begins. But, growth rate itself is a difference, and another difference on this difference 
would have little sense in representing the variation of growth.  
As for GDP per capita, it measures the change in absolute value, and its difference 
in scale with other indicators which we would use (various ratios between zero and one, 
for instance presenting financial development) might cause sensitivity problem in the 
estimation. To avoid these potential problems, we use our new indicator for growth: the 
percent of GDP per capita in one province of one year relative to the total of all 
provinces in that year (GDPRATIO). This indicator, which varies between 0 and 1, will 
be an absolute value in each year, and its variation represents the annual growth from one 
year to the next. In addition, it not only captures the growth of one province in a specific 
year, but it also contains the information of relative development across different 
provinces.  
 
 Control variables 
The economic growth category includes control variables such as: government 
expenditure over GDP (GOV) as a measure of the scale of government, length of 
railway per square kilometer (HW) as a proxy for transportation development, and the 
ratio of total trade to GDP (OPENNESS). To ensure that the interaction term of FDI 
and financial indicators does not proxy for FDI or the level of development of financial 
sector alone, both of the latter variables, i.e. FDI and financial indicators, should be 
included in the regression independently. The summary statistics of all variables are 
presented in Table 3. 
                                                        
12 Although economists have a long way to go before they reach a consensus about which variables should 
be included in their growth regression, Sala-I-Martin (1997a and 1997b) provide a useful method to test for 
the robustness of different variables in explaining economic growth.  
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[Table 3 about here] 
 IV. Empirical Analysis 
Model specification  
This section presents the specification of our empirical model. To avoid the endogeneity 
problem, we construct a dynamic panel-data model as follows: 
 
                                   
'
11 2 it i it it it yy X α ββε − =+ + +                                            (1) 
 
where  y and  X  represent  GDPRATIO and independent variables respectively;  i α  
represent fixed individual differences between each province;  it ε are error terms. First 
difference of equation (1) would eliminate the fixed specific effects of each province and 
therefore we get 
 
         
'
111 2 2 1 1 () () ( ) it it it it it it it it yy y y XX ββ ε ε −− − − − −= − + − + −                     (2) 
 
For estimation of equation (2), we use the system of Generalized-Method-Moments 
(GMM) panel estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond 
(1998)
13. In order to control for the possible endogeneity of the regressors, we use once 
lagged first differenced of the regressions as instruments in the level equation. The 
inclusion of the regression in levels in addition to that in first differences help to cope 
with weak instrument biases. 
The consistency of GMM estimator depends on the validity of the assumption that 
1 it it ε ε − −   does not exhibit serial correlations and the validity of the instruments. 
Therefore, we use the AR (2) test and the Sargan test to test for second order serial 
correlation and over-identifying restrictions, respectively. Failure to reject each of the null 
hypotheses of both tests would guarantee the feasibility of this model.  
                                                        
13The GMM estimator has been widely used in recent empirical analysis, particularly in the studies of 
macroeconomics and finance. This method has a number of advantages: the GMM estimator is good in 
exploiting the time-series variation in the data, accounting for unobserved individual effects, allowing for the 
inclusion of lagged dependent variables as regressors, and therefore providing better control for endogeneity 
of all the explanatory variables. See Beck et. al., (2000) for a complete discussion of the advantages and 
limitations of GMM estimators.  
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 The results 
As previously explained, the aim of this paper is to empirically investigate whether the 
development of China’s financial sector is a factor in the link between FDI and 
economic growth. Therefore, the empirical analysis focuses first-and-foremost on the 
interaction terms between FDI and the finance indicators, but also take into 
consideration aspects of the FDI variable and finance indicators alone. Table 4 to Table 
12 reports estimates of equation (2) using each of the nine financial indicators as the 
independent variable in the regression and, hence directly provide the results of central 
interest of this paper. 
We begin by providing the general results: The regressions satisfy the specifications 
tests, that is., all results are proved to reject the null hypothesis of second order 
autocorrelation, and they pass the Sargan specification test. The coefficients of the lag of 
GDPRATIO are significantly positive in all nine tables, and thus display a strong 
relationship with the dependent variable from one period to the next. Also our proxies 
for openness, the share of government investment and transportation enters as positive 
and significant determinants of economic growth. 
 
Group1: Indicators of  financial depth  
Tables 4 and 5 report estimates of equation (2) using the two measures of financial 
depth in each province as finance indicators, that is., the ratio of real total credit to GDP 
and the ratio of household savings to GDP. The outcomes in the Tables show that FDI 
is positive and significantly related to economic growth. The interaction terms are 
negative and significant in this group using any of the three alternative specifications. 
That is, the results remain unchanged whether or not we use a higher than average value 
of the finance indicator in the regression. When entered as a single variable, the Finance 1 
and Finance 2 indicators in Table 4 and Table 5, also displays a significantly negative 
relationship with economic growth. A somewhat cautious interpretation of the results 
given by the threshold model may be warranted due to a fewer number of observations 
used in the regression. But, the problem noted, these results at least crudely support our 
conclusion. 
 
[Table 4 about here]  
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Our findings contrast with the typical conclusion of most cross-country studies that have 
analyzed the finance-growth nexus, finding a positive link between financial depth and 
economic growth. On the other hand, they confirm the findings for China in Guarglia 
and Poncet (2006). The present paper suggests that these negative effects spills-over to 
the interaction between FDI and the finance indicators. As explained in Naughton (2006), 
China has a far deeper financial system than any other major transition economy. But, 
this achievement also had costs. With a banking system full of cash, government officials 
have naturally been tempted to use bank surpluses to finance SOEs. Indeed, financing 
for these firms shifted toward reliance on bank financing during the mid-1980s. In part, 
this change was a conscious policy response to the decline in budgetary revenues from 
costless budgetary grants to interest-bearing, repayable loans. Thus, our findings are at 
least partly attributed by the policies which promoted inefficient allocation of savings as 
SOBs were forced to lend on non-commercial terms thus forcing the intermediation of 
savings into capital with low returns on the margin. These facts, in turn, weaken the 
relationship between FDI and China’s domestic financial system, as given by the negative 
and significant interaction term. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Group 2: Indicators for misallocation and distortion 
Tables 6 and 7 reports the estimates using the two indicators for government 
intervention in financial resources in a province, that is; the ratio of loans to deposits 
(Finance 3) and the ratio of SOBs credit to total bank credits (Finance 4). Larger value of 
these two indicators would imply more severe intervention. Both Tables reports 
significant and positive coefficients of the FDI variable alone. Table 6 reports no 
significant coefficients of the interaction term, while the interaction terms displayed in 
Table 7 is both significant and negative. The finance indicator alone displays a significant 
negative relationship with economic growth in both Tables. These findings are attributed 
to the inefficient allocation of savings by the state-banking sector, as well to the fact that 
state-owned banks largely – but recently to a lesser extent – support the relatively 
inefficient state-owned sector. 
 
[Table 6 about here]  
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[Table 7 about here] 
 
Group 3: Indicators for market-oriented financial transactions 
This group of financial indicators represents market-oriented financing. Financial 
resources of fixed asset are categorized into three types, that is. budget appropriation, 
domestic loans and self-raised funds. As the budget of these three means of financing 
tightens, the efficiency is also supposed to be increasing with them. That is, harder 
budget constraints lead to more efficient use of the capital. 
The empirical findings perfectly coincide with this predication. Of particular interest 
to this paper and, as reported in Table 8, with the ratio of domestic loans over budget 
appropriation (Finance 5) as the finance indicator, we find that the interaction between 
FDI and the finance indicator display a significant and positive effect on economic 
growth when the finance indicator is above its average value
14. Moreover, both FDI and 
the finance indicator alone are positive and significant in the regression. Thus, the result 
in Table 8 also give support to the findings in Hao (2006) and imply that the more 
domestic loans relative to budget appropriation, the more efficient use of the financial 
resources.  
 
[Table 8 about here] 
  
Table 9 reports that higher shares of self-raised funds have positive and significant 
impacts on economic growth through its interactions with FDI. Thus, the findings 
support those reported in Table 8. The FDI variable alone provide mixed results but 
indicate there is generally a significant and positive effect on economic growth. Table 10 
reports that financing through budgetary appropriation exerts a significant negative 
impact on economic growth by its own means but, more importantly so for this paper, 
also suggest that its interaction with FDI is negative and significant. 
  
[Table 9 about here] 
  
[Table 10 about here] 
                                                        
14 As previously noted, the fewer observations used in the threshold specification warrants some concern as 
to the validity of the results.  
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Table 11 and Table 12 report the findings using the finance indicators that instrument the 
efficiency of domestic financial sector development. Table 11 reports the result using 
credit from non-SOBs, that is., the Finance 8 indicator. Here the interaction term displays 
negative and significant coefficients in all three specifications. When entered as a single 
variable, the Finance 8 indicator displays a positive and significant coefficient, and so do 
the FDI variable. These results suggests that financing from non-SOB sources, at least 
generally speaking, are better utilized than credit provided by the SOBs, but that there is 
an incomplete relationship between the financial intermediaries and FDI. 
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
Table 12 reports the results using the ratio of credits to the private sector to total credit 
(Finance 9) as an indicator for the marketization process of financial resources. As we can 
see from the Table, there is a significantly positive impact on economic growth when 
credit to the private sector interacts with FDI, while the FDI variable alone displays a 
significantly negative effect on economic growth. Even though these results warrants 
concern due to the limited number of observations, the notion that economic growth 
responds positively to the interaction of market-oriented financing and FDI is 
noteworthy; follows logic, and is in line with the results previously derived in this paper.  
All-in-all, Table 8 through Table 12 suggest that less state interventionism and more 
market-oriented financing mechanisms is a factor in the link between FDI and economic 
growth.  
  
[Table 12 about here] 
 
V. Summary 
The past decades has witnessed dramatic increases in foreign capital flows to China, of 
which foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a crucial role. The economics-literature 
explains well the short-term considerations, such as the determinants and consequences 
of such inflows, in China. But, as financial integration becomes a reality for China it is 
intrinsically important that we develop a better understanding of how economic growth 
respond to FDI and what role the domestic financial system plays in this process. That is, 
we must also address the longer-term consequences of financial sector development.  
  20
This paper is the first attempt to analyze that role in China. So far, this has been largely 
neglected in the empirical literature on China. The present paper uses a dynamic panel-
data model and data for 28 Chinese provinces over the period 1986-2003. We have 
focused on a wide range of financial indicators, accounting both for the size and the 
quality of financial institutions, and which represent different functions in China’s 
financial system. Moving beyond the existing literature, we have also introduced new 
measures of economic growth, as well as interaction between FDI and finance indicators.  
This paper support the empirical literature in general, such as Bailliu (2000), Hermes 
and Lensink (2003), Alfaro et al., (2004), and Durham (2004), and provides new evidence 
for China in particular, that the development of financial intermediation towards more 
market-oriented financing is a factor in the link between FDI and economic growth. 
Although this premise has been gaining popularity, there has been no available 
econometric evidence to the authors’ knowledge to support this claim for China until 
now. The results also provide further support to Cheng and Degryse (2006), Guarglia 
and Poncet (2006), and Guillmont et al., (2006) who argue that banking sector 
development spurs economic growth in China. 
China’s financial system is not yet developed according to the standards of 
industrialized countries, but the steady development of the country’s financial system do 
enhance the response of economic growth to FDI. Further adoption of market based 
lending principles and less state intervention in financing is likely to enhance this effect. 
Although these results in fact suggest that China might receive more benefits from its 
domestic financial system than previously understood, the results imply that continued 
financial sector reforms would provide an even better economic environment for foreign 
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Table 1: Concentration of deposits and loans: Four State- Owned Bank 
concentration ratios (%), 1990 – 2003 
  1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Deposits  91 72 69 71 70 63 62 59 57 56 
Loans  98 68 69 66 69 59 56 54 53 52 










Table 2: Development of financial markets, 1990 – 2003 (percent) 
  1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
M2/GDP  82 104 112 122 133 146 151 163 176 189 
FIR  171 177 181 194 225 221 222 237 260 279 
FMR  30 58 58 57 54 74 71 68 82 91 
NBC/GDP  4 17 20 23 25 24 24 27 25 20 
HHSFI/GDP  35 47 54 61 67 71 70 71 75 78 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook. M2/GDP = money and quasi-money / gross domestic product; 























Table 3: Descriptive statistics, 1986—2003 
Variable  Mean Std  dev Min  Max Obser
Dependent Variable          
 GDP per capita ratio   0.036  0.022  0.01  0.125  476 
FDI and Controls         
 FDI/GDP  0.029  0.041  0  0.241  471 
 Openness  0.22  0.283  0.03  1.72  476 
 Government expenditure/GDP  0.131  0.053  0.05  0.35  476 
 Length of railway per sq. km  0.724  0.579  0.1  2.61  476 
Financial Indicators         
 Total credits/GDP (Finance 1)  0.798 0.316 0.319 2.75 454 
 Household savings/GDP(Finance 2) 0.514  0.289  0.14  2.38  476 
 Loans/deposits (Finance 3) 1.108  0.372  0.422 3.147  476 
 State-owned bank credits/total bank 
 credit (Finance 4) 
0.724 0.136 0.44  0.937 450 
 Financing by domestic loans/state 
 budgetary appropriation (Finance 5) 
4.68 3.636 0.12  21.54  440 
 Financing by self-raised funds/  
 total financing (Finance 6) 
0.475 0.0918 0.27  0.74  440 
 Financing by budgetary appropriation 
 /total financing (Finance 7) 
0.086 0.072 0.01 0.52 440 
 Non-bank credits/GDP(Finance 8) 0.148  0.168  0.037 1.47  454 
 Credits to private sectors/total credit 
(Finance 9)  



























Table 4: Financial Indicator: the ratio of real total credits to GDP 
Variables  FDI*Finance    FDI*dummy      Threshold 
Gdpratio (LD)    0.830 *** 
  (0.017) 
  0.839*** 
  (0.0175) 
   0.719*** 
   (0.030) 
FDI (D1)    0.026*** 
  (0.005 ) 
  0.018*** 
  (0.0041) 
   0.003 
   (0.004) 
FDI (LD)    0.0005 
  (0.003 ) 
  -0.0008 
  (0.003) 
   0.002 
   (0.004) 
Openness (D1)    0.0027 *** 
  (0.0004) 
  0.002*** 
  (0.0004)   
   0.004*** 
   (0.001) 
Interaction term (D1)    -0.0206 *** 
  (0.005) 
  -0.0104*** 
  (0.003) 
   -0.0186*** 
   (0.002) 
Finance 1     0.0002 
  (0.0003)   
  -0.0003 
  (0.0003) 
   -0.001*** 
   (0.0005) 
GovExp        0.0060*** 
  (0.001) 
  0.005*** 
  (0.001) 
   0.011*** 
   (0.002) 
Railway       0.0015 *** 
  (0.0005) 
  0.0015*** 
  (0.0005) 
   -0.0006 
   (0.0007) 
Constant    -0.00005 *** 
  (0.00001) 
  -0.00005*** 
  (0.00001) 
   -0.00009 
   (0.00002) 
Observations      417      417       200 
Sargan test      0.033      0.0251       0.5707 
P-value autocorrelation AR(2)      0.6725      0.6997       0.3980 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP per capita ratio. *, **, ***denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. Standard deviations in parentheses.  GDPratio = per capita gross domestic product ratio; FDI 














Table 5: Financial Indicator: The ratio of household savings to GDP 
Variables  FDI*Finance       FDI*dummy      Threshold 
Gdpratio (LD)    0.824 *** 
  (0.017)  
  0.807*** 
  (0.0167) 
    0.709*** 
    (0.039) 
FDI (D1)    0.018*** 
  (0.004 ) 
  0.0109*** 
  (0.003) 
    0.011** 
    (0.004) 
FDI (LD)    0.0056** 
  (0.003 ) 
  0.0035  
  (0.003) 
    -0.0048  
    (0.004) 
Openness (D1)    0.003 *** 
  (0.0003) 
  0.003*** 
  (0.0004)   
    0.003*** 
    (0.0005) 
Interactions (D1)    -0.022 *** 
  (0.005) 
  -0.0104*** 
  (0.003) 
    -0.001** 
    (0.0007) 
Finance 2     -0.001 
  (0.0006)   
  -0.002*** 
  (0.0004) 
    0.0003  
    (0.001) 
GovExp        0.005*** 
  (0.0016) 
  0.004*** 
  (0.0016) 
    0.003 
    (0.003) 
Railway       0.0013 ** 
  (0.0005) 
  0.001** 
  (0.0005) 
    0.003***  
    (0.0009) 
Constant    -0.00001  
  (0.00002) 
  -0.00003* 
  (0.00001) 
    -0.00009* 
    (0.00005) 
Observations      439      439       186 
Sargan test      0.0695      0.0212       0.89 
P-value autocorrelation AR(2)      0.5202      0.5060       0.88 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP per capita ratio. *, **, ***denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. Standard deviations in parentheses. GDPratio = per capita gross domestic product ratio; FDI 










Table 6: Financial Indicator: The ratio of loans to deposits 
Variables  FDI*Finance     FDI*dummy      Threshold  
Gdpratio (LD)    0.816*** 
  (0.018) 
  0.827*** 
  (0.0173) 
   0.794*** 
   (0.041) 
FDI (D1)    0.009 
  (0.007 ) 
  0.007** 
  (0.003) 
   0.01  
   (0.013) 
FDI (LD)    -0.0008 
  (0.003 ) 
  -0.001  
  (0.003) 
   0.004  
   (0.007) 
Openness (D1)    0.002 *** 
  (0.0004) 
  0.002*** 
  (0.0003)   
   0.0003 ** 
   (0.001) 
Interaction term (D1)    -0.001 
  (0.007) 
  0.0008  
  (0.002) 
   -0.003 
   (0.012) 
Finance 3     -0.001*** 
  (0.0003)   
  -0.001*** 
  (0.0003) 
   -0.0007 
   (0.0004) 
GovExp        0.0035*** 
  (0.001) 
  0.0047*** 
  (0.0017) 
   0.003 
   (0.002) 
Railway       0.001** 
  (0.0005) 
  0.0009** 
  (0.0005) 
   0.003*** 
   (0.0005) 
Constant   -0.0001 *** 
 (0.00002) 
  -0.0001*** 
  (0.00002) 
   -0.0001*** 
   (0.00003) 
Observations      439      439       209 
Sargan test      0.0831      0.0763       0.86 
P-value autocorrelation AR(2)      0.5369      0.4561       0.4919 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP per capita ratio.*, **, ***denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. Standard deviations in parentheses. GDPratio = per capita gross domestic product ratio; FDI 








Table 7: Financial Indicator: The ratio of SOBs credits to total bank credits 
Variables  FDI*Finance    FDI*dummy      Threshold  
Gdpratio (LD)    0.833*** 
  (0.019) 
  0.803*** 
  (0.0179) 
   0.684*** 
   (0.028) 
FDI (D1)    -0.02 
  (0.015 ) 
  0.015*** 
  (0.003) 
   0.065*** 
   (0.014) 
FDI (LD)    0.001 
  (0.003 ) 
  0.006** 
  (0.003) 
   0.002*** 
   (0.004) 
Openness (D1)    0.0021 *** 
  (0.0004) 
  0.002*** 
  (0.0004)   
   0.002*** 
   (0.0007) 
Interactions (D1)    -0.036** 
  (0.018) 
  -0.013*** 
  (0.002) 
   -0.071*** 
   (0.0179) 
Finance 4     -0.0016**  
  (0.0008) 
  0.001 
  (0.0007) 
   -0.0007 
   (0.0011) 
GovExp        0.0055*** 
  (0.002) 
  0.003* 
  (0.001) 
   0.0007 
   (0.002) 
Railway       0.0015 *** 
  (0.0005) 
  0.0011** 
  (0.0005) 
   0.0086*** 
   (0.0007) 
Constant    -0.00007 *** 
  (0.00001) 
  -0.00004*** 
  (0.00001) 
   -0.00009*** 
   (0.00002) 
Observations       413      413       215 
Sargan test       0.07      0.03       0.041 
P-value autocorrelation AR(2)       0.733      0.723       0.531 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP per capita ratio. *, **, ***denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. Standard deviations in parentheses. GDPratio = per capita gross domestic product ratio; FDI 








Table 8: Financial Indicator: The ratio of fixed asset financed by domestic loans 
to state budgetary appropriation 
Variables  FDI*Finance    FDI*dummy     Threshold          
Gdpratio (LD)     0.813 *** 
   (0.019) 
  0.824* 
  (0.019 
   0.855*** 
   (0.048) 
FDI (D1)     0.0068 
   (0.004 ) 
  0.0006 
  (0.004) 
   0.015*** 
   (0.007) 
FDI (LD)     0.0001 
   (0.003 ) 
  0.0009 
  (0.003) 
   0.005 
   (0.003) 
Openness (D1)     0.0028 *** 
   (0.0004) 
  0.002*** 
  (0.0005   
   0.002** 
   (0.001) 
Interactions (D1)     0.00009 
   (0.0004) 
  0.007** 
  (0.003) 
   0.001** 
   (0.0006) 
Finance 5       0.000002  
   (0.00003)   
  0.000005 
  (0.00002) 
   0.0001*** 
   (0.00004) 
GovExp         0.003 
   (0.002) 
  0.003* 
  (0.002 
   -0.006 
   (0.007) 
Railway        0.001** 
   (0.0005) 
  0.0009* 
  (0.0005) 
   0.003** 
   (0.001) 
Constant     -0.00005 *** 
   (0.00001) 
  -0.00005*** 
  (0.00001) 
   -0.0001** 
   (0.00004) 
Observations      403      403      157 
Sargan test      0.196      0.3121      0.857 
P-value autocorrelation AR(2)      0.4981      0.4538      0.5083 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP per capita ratio. *, **, ***denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. Standard deviations in parentheses. GDPratio = per capita gross domestic product ratio; FDI 
= foreign direct investment; Finance 5 = financing by domestic loans / state budgetary appropriation; 





Table 9: Financial Indicator: The ratio of fixed asset financed by self raised funds 
to total credit 
     Variables     FDI*Finance      FDI*dummy     Threshold 
Gdpratio (LD)    0.822*** 
  (0.018) 
  0.825*** 
  (0.019) 
  0.847*** 
  (0.029) 
FDI (D1)    -0.026* 
  (0.012 ) 
  0.006* 
  (0.0039) 
  0.049** 
  (0.017) 
FDI (LD)    0.002 
  (0.003 ) 
  0.0005 
  (0.003) 
  0.001 
  (0.005) 
Openness (D1)    0.0028 *** 
  (0.0004) 
  0.002*** 
  (0.0004)   
  -0.005 
  (0.001) 
Interactions (D1)    0.05 *** 
  (0.024) 
  0.0003 
  (0.002) 
  -0.055 
  (0.035) 
Finance 6      0.0002  
  (0.0003)   
  0.001 
  (0.0007) 
  0.00001 
  (0.0009) 
GovExp        0.004*** 
  (0.001) 
  0.003** 
  (0.0017) 
  0.002 
  (0.003) 
Railway       0.001** 
  (0.0005) 
  0.0012** 
  (0.0005) 
  0.0044*** 
  (0.0007) 
Constant    -0.00005 *** 
  (0.00001) 
  -0.00005*** 
  (0.00001) 
  -0.00003* 
  (0.00002) 
Observations      403      403      209 
Sargan test      0.243      0.289      0.89 
P-value autocorrelation test      0.276      0.537      0.175 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP per capita ratio. *, **, ***denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. Standard deviations in parentheses. GDPratio = per capita gross domestic product ratio; FDI 








Table 10: Financial Indicator: The ratio of fixed asset financed by budgetary 
appropriation to total credit 
Variables      FDI*Finance    FDI*dummy     Threshold  
Gdpratio (LD)    0.816 *** 
  (0.019) 
  0.820*** 
  (0.019) 
  0.852*** 
  (0.036) 
FDI (D1)    0.006* 
  (0.004 ) 
  0.009*** 
  (0.0003) 
  0.001 
  (0.006) 
FDI (LD)    0.00035 
  (0.003 ) 
  -0.0002 
  (0.003) 
  0.003 
  (0.003) 
Openness (D1)    0.003 *** 
  (0.0004) 
  0.002*** 
  (0.0004)   
  0.007*** 
  (0.002) 
Interactions (D1)    0.023  
  (0.03) 
  -0.0074** 
  (0.003) 
  -0.047** 
  (0.026) 
Finance 7      0.001  
  (0.001)   
  -0.007** 
  (0.003) 
  -0.006 
  (0.0009) 
GovExp        0.0007*** 
  (0.0023) 
  0.0006* 
  (0.002) 
  0.002 
  (0.002) 
Railway       0.001 *** 
  (0.0005) 
  0.0007 
  (0.005) 
  0.0012*** 
  (0.0005) 
Constant    -0.00006 *** 
  (0.00001) 
  -0.00005*** 
  (0.00001) 
  -0.00007*** 
  (0.00002) 
Observations      403      403      200 
Sargan test      0.1774      0.2279      0.864 
P-value autocorrelation test      0.537      0.5044      0.27 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP per capita ratio. *, **, ***denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. Standard deviations in parentheses. GDPratio = per capita gross domestic product ratio; FDI 







Table 11: Financial Indicator: The ratio of non-bank credit to GDP 
Variables  FDI*Finance   FDI*dummy     Threshold 






















































Observations      417      417      166 
Sargan test      0.160      0.0523      0.8823 
P-value autocorrelation AR(2)      0.5915      0.6717      0.8559 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP per capita ratio. *, **, ***denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. Standard deviations in parentheses. GDPratio = per capita gross domestic product ratio; FDI 













Table 12: Financial Indicator: The ratio of private sector credit to total credit 
Variables  FDI*Finance    FDI*dummy      Threshold  
Gdpratio (LD)    0.649 *** 
  (0.034) 
  0.645*** 
  (0.034) 
   0.517*** 
   (0.053) 
FDI (D1)    -0.007 
  (0.005 ) 
  -0.006 
  (0.005) 
   -0.021*** 
   (0.006) 
FDI (LD)    0.007 
  (0.004 ) 
  0.0007 
  (0.004) 
   0.002 
   (0.005) 
Openness (D1)    0.006 *** 
  (0.0006) 
  0.006*** 
  (0.0006)   
   -0.001 
   (0.0016) 
Interactions (D1)    0.001 *** 
  (0.019) 
  -0.002 
  (0.002) 
   0.0196* 
   (0.0132) 
Finance 9      -0.0009  
  (0.0001)   
  -0.0003 
  (0.0011) 
   -0.0005  
   (0.0012) 
GovExp        -0.002 
  (0.003) 
  0.005*** 
  (0.001) 
   -0.004 
   (0.004) 
Railway       0.0021*** 
  (0.0007) 
  0.0021*** 
  (0.0007) 
   0.002*** 
   (0.0009) 
Constant    -0.00003  
  (0.000043) 
  -0.00003*** 
  (0.00004) 
   -0.00008 
   (0.00006) 
Observations      196      196       97 
Sargan test      0.242      0.277       0.0058 
P-value autocorrelation test      0.116      0.18       0.276 
Note: Dependent variable: GDP per capita ratio. *, **, ***denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. Standard deviations in parentheses. GDPratio = per capita gross domestic product ratio; FDI 
= foreign direct investment; Finance 9 = credit to private sectors ; GovExp = government expenditure. 
 